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They often emphasize process over result, believing that ultimately
process can become substance.I
One example of this transatlantic divide is the contrasting means
by which American and European governmental institutions
implement and enforce targeted sanctions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations (Charter). A comparison of the legislation that
America and Europe have adopted to implement such targeted
sanctions, and of the way that American and European courts address
challenges to such sanctions, reveals that in Europe, targeted sanctions
mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter are regarded as absolute
obligations outside the reach of local legal constraints. In the United
States, by contrast, such Chapter VII measures are regarded as
mandatory obligations only to the extent that they are consistent with
domestic law.
This article explores these divergent approaches to targeted
sanctions and explains how, as a consequence, a commonly held
belief-that in the "war" on terror, American institutions are more
willing to sacrifice human rights than their European counterparts-
appears to be turned on its head. In America, courts entertain
challenges to targeted sanctions under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.2 If the sanctions fail to satisfy the
requirements of due process, they will be invalidated in the same
manner as a purely domestic measure would be stricken. In Europe,
by contrast, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities
has refused to entertain challenges, brought under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to targeted sanctions that were
specifically mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of
the Charter.3 The Court of First Instance has ruled that invalidating
such sanctions would constitute an unacceptable violation of Article
25 of the Charter (requiring Member States to "accept and carry out"
Chapter VII "decisions").4 Accordingly, for an individual or entity
1. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER 4-5 (2003).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Case T-306/01, Yusufv. Council of the Eur. Union, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3533.
4. Id. para. 239-40; cf. Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du
peuple d'Iran v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2006 E.C.R. 00 (2006) ("OMPI")
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against which the Security Council has mandated that Chapter VII
targeted sanctions be applied, greater procedural protections are
available if the United States, rather than Europe, is implementing the
sanctions.
This article is not intended to definitively resolve why Europe and
America have such conflicting approaches to the relationship between
local due process guarantees and international legal obligations.
Nevertheless, in the conclusion, I suggest that perhaps the cause of
these conflicting views lies in the fact that America has adopted a
dualist legal system while the European system is more aptly
described as monist.5 Regardless of the cause for this difference,
critics of the American approach may be surprised that it results in
relatively greater human rights protections, even in the context of the
"war" on terror.
The next part of this article presents a brief history of Security
Council-mandated targeted sanctions, and explains the conflict that
arises between due process concerns and a State's obligations under
Article 25 of the Charter. Part II sets forth the targeted sanctions
regime first established in Resolution 1267 and amended and
expanded by subsequent Security Council resolutions. Parts III and
IV compare how the courts of the European Union and the United
States resolve local due process challenges to sanctions imposed
pursuant to such resolutions. Part V considers whether the 1267
sanctions regime can be amended to provide greater due process
protections and thus eliminate the dilemma created when Article 25 of
the Charter conflicts with local due process guarantees. Finally, Part
VI concludes this article by offering a possible explanation for the
divergent European and American approaches to this issue.
I. BACKGROUND
Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council to take
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security
through a two-tiered structure. First, under Article 41, the Security
(holding that where the Security Council has not mandated the specific sanction
being challenged, the Court of First Instance has the authority to scrutinize targeted
sanctions under the ECHR). See infra Part III.C. for a more detailed comparison of
the OMPI and Yusuf decisions.
5. See infra Part VI.
2008]
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Council may take "measures not involving the use of armed force."
6
Second, if "the Security Council consider[s] that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate," it may take measures involving the use of armed force.7
This two-tiered structure reflects one of the principal concerns of the
Charter: the avoidance of the "scourge of war" by permitting the use
of force only in the most extreme of circumstances.
8
Article 41 does not enumerate the full panoply of measures that
the Security Council may take, short of the use of armed force, to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 41 does,
however, explicitly refer to one of the most common such measures:
"complete or partial interruption of economic relations"-i.e. the
imposition of sanctions. 9
The most comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by the
Security Council occurred in the 1990s against the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein.10 While this sanctions regime had some success in
achieving its stated goals of constraining Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs and preventing future acts of aggression against
Kuwait," it also wrought severe humanitarian consequences on the
Iraqi people.' 2  To avoid future "negative humanitarian
consequences... on innocent civilian populations[,]" the Security
Council has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions. 13  Because
6. U.N. Charter art. 41.
7. U.N. Charter art. 42.
8. U.N. Charter pmbl.; see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY Vol. 1 34-35 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed., 2002).
9. U.N. Charter art. 41.
10. The Iraq sanctions regime was initially adopted pursuant to Resolution 661
(1990) and further confirmed by Resolution 687 (1991). S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
11. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
12. See Interim Report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United
Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, at 4 (Feb. 3, 2005); Richard Falk, Iraq, the
United States, and International Law: Beyond the Sanctions, Aug. 27, 2002,
http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forummeet/2002/FalkIraqUSinternatLaw.html
("The imposition and retention of comprehensive sanctions for more than a decade
after the devastation of the Gulf War has resulted in hundreds of thousands of
civilian casualties, more than a million according to some estimates .... affecting
most acutely, the very young and the poorest sectors of the Iraqi population.").
13. WATSON INSTITUTE TARGETED SANCTIONS PROJECT, STRENGTHENING
4
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targeted sanctions apply to particular individuals, rather than to entire
nations, targeted sanctions are viewed as mechanisms to maintain or
restore international peace and security without undermining a
national economy or social services system.14  Thus, the move
towards targeted sanctions reflects a second principal concern of the
Charter: "solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and . . promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion .... 15
The most extensive targeted sanctions regime that the Security
Council has adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter was first
established by Resolution 1267 (1999), which imposed sanctions on
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.' 6 Resolution 1267 also created a
committee to implement and monitor those sanctions (1267
Committee). 17  As is described in more detail below, the targeted
TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES 5 (2006), available
at http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening-Targeted-Sanctions.pdf [hereinafter
WATSON INSTITUTE REPORT]; see U.N.: Sanctions Rules Must Protect Due Process,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 4, 2002, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/03/04
/globa15839.htm.
14. See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) ("Reaffirming
the necessity for sanctions to contain adequate and effective exemptions to avoid
adverse humanitarian consequences on the people of Afghanistan..
15. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
16. Bardo Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process at 4, Mar. 20,
2006 [hereinafter Fassenbender Report], available at http://www.un.org/law/
counsel/Fassbenderstudy.pdf; WATSON INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.
The targeted sanctions regime established by Resolution 1267 is not the first such
regime adopted by the Security Council. Prior Security Council resolutions
adopting targeted sanctions include Resolution 841 (1993) (targeting "the
Government of Haiti or . . . the de facto authorities in Haiti"), Resolution 1054
(1996) (targeting "members of the Government of Sudan") and Resolution 1127
(1997) (targeting members of Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de
Angola).
17. The 1267 Committee consists of all the members of the Security Council.
See GUIDELINES OF THE [1267] COMMITTEE FOR THE CONDUCT OF ITS WORK, 2(a),
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267-guidelines.pdf. The 1267
Committee is responsible for, inter alia, maintaining a list of individuals and entities
against which targeted sanctions are applied. Id. IM 5, 6. Individuals and entities are
added to that list when (a) a Member State of the United Nations proposes that the
individual or entity be added to the list; and (b) the 1267 Committee approves that
proposal. Id. 6(g). The Committee makes decisions "by consensus of its
20081 259
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sanctions established pursuant to Resolution 1267 have been amended
and expanded on various occasions by the Security Council. 18
Pursuant to such amendments and expansions, the targeted sanctions
initially limited to the Taliban under Resolution 1267 now apply to
"Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him as
designated by the [1267] Committee . .,9 These sanctions are
widely viewed as a critical instrument in the "war" on terror.20
While targeted sanctions are championed as Chapter VII measures
that alleviate the humanitarian burdens associated with more
traditional, comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions are also
criticized insofar as the Security Council, an inherently political body,
decides to deprive specific individuals and entities of their rights to
liberty and property without the judicial or procedural safeguards
guaranteed by international human rights covenants and domestic
constitutions (hereinafter referred to as "due process rights").21 Thus,
there is some question as to whether the use of targeted sanctions truly
achieves the Charter's desire to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms. '22  Recently,
individuals and/or private entities who have suffered deprivations of
their liberty interests pursuant to targeted sanctions adopted by the
members." Id. I 4(a).
18. See infra Part IT.
19. S.C. Res. 1333, 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
20. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1617 (July 29, 2005)
("Underscoring the importance of ... robust implementation of existing [targeted
sanctions] measures as a significant preventative measure in combating terrorist
activity.") (emphasis in original); WATSON INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5
("Sanctions to stem the financing of terrorism or to deny safe haven or travel by
terrorists have become valuable tools in the global effort to counter terrorism.").
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 8, 10, 11, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N.
Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 14, 1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966); European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), opened for signature
Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHRJ; see also Bill Bowring, UN,
EU and the Court of Appeal all say: No Procedural Human Rights Guarantees
forTterrorist Suspects at 3, http://www.ejdm.de/BB%20article%20for%20SL%
20asset%20freezing%201011 .pdf.
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3. This is particularly worrisome when
individuals are targeted as a result of their perceived affiliation with non-state
organizations that do not have readily available rosters of members.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2008], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss2/2
THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE
Security Council (and implemented by Member States) have argued in
the domestic courts of the implementing State that such sanctions
violate their due process rights as guaranteed under that State's local
law. 23
While to date, "no national or regional court has invalidated
measures giving effect to a listing by a UN sanctions committee, "24
such challenges present a dilemma for the reviewing court. If the
court exercises jurisdiction to review the sanctions under local due
process standards, the court may ultimately invalidate those sanctions.
Declaring the sanctions invalid, in turn, not only undermines a key
weapon in the "war" on terror,25 but also constitutes a violation of the
Member State's obligation under Article 25 of the Charter "to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. ' 26 Alternatively,
a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over the challenges (or a
court may feel that it does not have such jurisdiction to begin with), in
which case the court would remain passive in the face of possible
violations of local due process guarantees. The way that courts
resolve this dilemma will have far-reaching consequences on the
efficacy of targeted sanctions adopted by the Security Council, on
future compliance with Chapter VII resolutions, and on the perception
23. Throughout this article, I refer to the "local" law of Member States of the
United Nations. For the purposes of this article, by "local" law, I mean the law that
applies in limited jurisdictions. For example, I refer to the federal law of the United
States as local law. Moreover, I refer to the law of the European Community as
local law. This is to be contrasted with rules of customary international law andjus
cogens, which arguably do not have jurisdictional limits.
24. WATSON INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
25. One may question whether targeted sanctions are necessary to combat
terrorism. It has been estimated that the events of 9/11-the most prolific terrorist
attacks ever-cost only "between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 169 (2004). The war in Iraq, by
contrast, costs the American military an estimated $10 billion each month.
Editorial, A Visit Worth the Time and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at A20.
This article does not take a position on whether targeted sanctions are, in fact, an
integral tool in the "war" on terror. It is sufficient to note for the purposes of this
article, that such sanctions are perceived to be vital and have been pursued and
embraced by the international community (and in particular, the Security Council).
See S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 20.
26. U.N. Charter art. 25.
20081
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that the international community is committed to the protection of
individual rights and fundamental freedoms.
27
II. THE 1267 SANCTIONS REGIME
On December 8, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1214, which demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan "stop
providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their
organizations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to
bring indicted terrorists to justice ... ,28 The Taliban failed to
comply with this demand. In response, the Security Council adopted a
series of measures, beginning with Resolution 1267, which
accomplished the following: (a) established various sanctions to be
applied to persons and entities designated by the 1267 Committee; and
(b) mandated that Member States implement those sanctions. The
particular resolutions effecting these requirements are discussed
below.
A. Resolution 1267 (1999)
On October 15, 1999, the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter, adopted Resolution 1267.29 Resolution 1267
demanded that "the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden without
further delay." 30 In order to enforce that demand, Resolution 1267
provided that all States shall (a) restrict the use of aircraft "owned,
leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban" and (b) "freeze
27. See generally WATSON INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3; Peter
Gutherie, Note, Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Am. L. 491, 515-16 (2004) ("Lacking effective [due process]
mechanisms at the international level, states will be forced to balance the dual
mandates of 'effective fulfillment of obligations under the U.N. Charter and the
protection of fundamental legal principles safeguarding individual rights."')
(quoting Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Address before the University of Amsterdam,
Centre for International Law, Roundtable on Review of the Security Council by
Member States after 11 September 2001 (Oct. 11, 2002)).
28. S.C. Res. 1214, 1 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998).
29. Resolution 1267 "[d]etermin[ed] that the failure of the Taliban authorities
to respond to the demands in paragraph 13 of Resolution 1214 (1998) constitutes a
threat to international peace and security ..... " S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. doc.
S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
30. Id. 2.
8
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funds and other financial resources" owned, controlled, or benefiting
the Taliban.3 ' Moreover, Resolution 1267 created the 1267
Committee and directed that Committee to, inter alia, identify and
designate such "aircraft and funds or other financial resources" to be
sanctioned by Member States.32 Thus, Resolution 1267 empowered
the 1267 Committee to determine what individuals or entities should
be sanctioned, and then required Member States to comply with those
determinations and implement the sanctions.
B. Resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002)
On December 19, 2000, the Security Council, acting pursuant to
Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted Resolution 1333, which
reaffirmed and significantly expanded the sanctions contained in
Resolution 1267 and, in turn, the powers of the 1267 Committee.
With respect to the Taliban regime, Resolution 1333 expanded the
1267 sanctions to include the following provisions:
* prohibiting the transfer of "arms and related materiel
of all types including weapons and ammunition,
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary
equipment, and spare parts for the
aforementioned .. .
* prohibiting the "sale, supply and transfer to the
territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control ... of
technical advice, assistance, or training related to
military activities . ... "34
* demanding the withdrawal of any agents advising "the
Taliban on military or related security matters .... 35
* requiring the closure of all offices of the Taliban and
of Ariana Afghan Airlines in the territory of Member
States.36
31. Id. [4.
32. Id. I 6(e).
33. S.C. Res. 1333, 1 5(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
34. Id. 5(b).
35. Id. I 5(c).
36. Id. T 8(a)-(b).
2008] 263
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prohibiting the "sale, supply or transfer ...of the
chemical acetic anhydride to any person in the
territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control.. ..,,37
Moreover-and more importantly for the purposes of this
article-Resolution 1333 mandated that Member States impose
sanctions against "Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities
associated with him as designated by the [1267] Committee." 38
Specifically, with respect to such designated individuals, Member
States were required to "freeze without delay funds and other financial
assets ...and to ensure that neither they nor any other funds or
financial resources are made available." 39
To implement and monitor these targeted sanctions against Usama
bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him, Resolution
1333 "requests the [1267] Committee to maintain an updated list,
based on information provided by States and regional organizations,
of the individuals and entities designated as being associated with
Usama bin Laden, including those in the Al-Qaida organization. 40
Thus, pursuant to Resolution 1333, once the 1267 Committee
designated an individual or entity as "associated with" Usama bin
Laden, Member States were required to freeze the funds and other
financial assets of such individuals or entities.
This scheme was repeated in Resolution 1390 (2002), which
expanded the sanctions against "Usama bin Laden, members of the
Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups,
undertakings and entities associated with them," as designated by the
1267 Committee "on the basis of relevant information provided by
Member States and regional organizations.'
C. Security Council "Improvements" to the 1267 Regime
Beginning with Resolution 1455 (2003), the Security Council
adopted a series of resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter to
further "improve" the 1267 sanctions regime. These improvements
direct Member States to provide a "statement of case" when proposing
37. Id. 10.
38. Id. 8(c).
39. Id.
40. Id. 8(c), 16(b) (emphasis added).
41. S.C. Res. 1390, 2, 5(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002).
10
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names for inclusion on the sanctions list, establish a mechanism
whereby listed individuals and entities may receive notice of their
designation, and enable listed individuals and entities to challenge
their listing directly to the 1267 Committee.
1. Statement of Case
The importance of providing the 1267 Committee with increased
details and information in support of a listing request was first
identified by the Security Council in operative paragraph 4 of
Resolution 1455, which
stresses to all Member States the importance of submitting to the
Committee the names and identifying information, to the extent
possible, of and about members of the Al-Qaida organization and
the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
associated with them so that the Committee can consider adding
new names and details to its list, unless to do so would compromise
investigations or enforcement actions .... 42
Similarly, operative paragraph 17 of Resolution 1526
[c]alls upon all States, when submitting new names to the
Committee's list, to include identifying information and
background information, to the greatest extent possible, that
demonstrates the individual(s)' and/or entity(ies)' association with
Usama bin Laden or with members of the Al-Qaida organization
and/or the Taliban, in line with the Committee's guidelines. 43
While these directives ostensibly provide a more informed basis
upon which the 1267 Committee would make designations, these
directives are not "decisions" of the Security Council and thus
Member States are not required to comply with them under Article 25
of the Charter.44 Accordingly, it was not clear that the goals of these
42. S.C. Res. 1455, $ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003).
43. S.C. Res. 1526, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004).
44. Article 25 of the Charter states that "[t]he Members of the United Nations
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter." U.N. Charter art. 25 (emphasis added). See THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY Vol. 1457 (Bruno Simma et al.
eds., 2d ed., 2002) ("[It is] positively clear that decisions taken under Chapter VII
2008]
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directives would be achieved. This concern was remedied by
Resolution 1617, pursuant to which the Security Council
[d]ecide[d] that, when proposing names for the Consolidated List,
States shall act in accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution 1526
(2004) and henceforth also shall provide to the Committee a
statement of case describing the basis of the proposal; and further
encourages States to identify any undertakings and entities owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the proposed subject .... 41
This requirement was reaffirmed and expanded in Resolution
1735, which
[d]ecide[d] that, when proposing names to the Committee for
inclusion on the Consolidated List, States shall act in accordance
with paragraph 17 of resolution 1526 (2004) and paragraph 4 of
resolution 1617 (2005) and provide a statement of case; the
statement of case should provide as much detail as possible on the
basis(es) for the listing, including: (i) specific information
supporting a determination that the individual or entity meets the
criteria above; (ii) the nature of the information and (iii) supporting
information or documents that can be provided; States should
include details of any connection between the proposed designee
and any currently listed individual or entity.46
Thus, Member States currently must support any designation
request with a statement of case, which "should provide as much
detail as possible" in support of the listing request.
2. Notice of Designation
Resolution 1735 also establishes a mechanism whereby listed
individuals and entities may be notified of their listing and of the
information upon which their listing was made. In particular,
operative paragraph 10 of Resolution 1735 requires the Secretariat,
"within two weeks after a name is added to the Consolidated list," to
notify the Permanent Mission of the Member State of which such
which are not couched in terms of a recommendation... [are] binding under Article
25.") (emphasis added).
45. S.C. Res. 1617, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
46. S.C. Res. 1735, 91 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006).
12
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person or entity is a national or is believed to be located.47 A Member
State receiving such notification is, in turn, "[c]all[ed] upon ...to
take reasonable steps according to their domestic laws and practices to
notify or inform the listed individual or entity of the
designation .... ,
48
Moreover, Member States proposing a name for designation are
"request[ed] ... to identify those parts of the statement of case which
may be publicly released for the purposes of notifying the listed
individual or entity, and those parts which may be released upon
request to interested States. 49  A Member State notifying or
informing a listed individual or entity of its designation is also
"call[ed] upon . . . to include with this notification a copy of the
publicly releasable portion of the statement of case .... 50
Thus, while Resolution 1735 ostensibly provides that individuals
and entities designated under the 1267 sanctions regime will receive
notice of their listing and the grounds therefore, such notice is not
mandatory, and even when given, may be partial and is always post
hoc.
3. The Right of Listed Individuals or Entities to
Challenge their Listing
Finally, Resolution 1730 (2006) requires the 1267 Committee (as
well as other United Nations sanctions committees) to adopt certain
de-listing procedures, including a procedure whereby listed
individuals or entities can directly petition their designation. 51 Listed
individuals or entities no longer have to rely on their State of
residence or nationality to challenge their listing.
52
47. Id. T 10.
48. Id. T 11.
49. Id. 6.
50. Id. 11.
51. S.C. Res. 1730, T 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
52. See id. Cf Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2005
E.C.R. 11-3533 (explaining that the then-governing procedures "set up a mechanism
for the re-examination of individual cases, by providing that the persons concerned
may address a request to the Sanctions Committee, through their national
authorities, in order . . . to be removed" from the Consolidated List) (emphasis
added).
20081
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Thus, together, Resolutions 1267, 1333, 1390, 1455, 1526, 1617,
1730 and 1735 (collectively the "1267 resolutions") establish a regime
whereby (1) a Member State may propose a name to the 1267
Committee, supported by "a statement of case describing the basis of
the proposal" and identifying which aspects of the statement of case,
if any, can be published; 53 (2) the 1267 Committee may designate
such a proposed individual or entity to be a target for sanctions; (3) all
Member States are obliged under the Charter to implement such
sanctions;54 (4) listed individuals may or may not receive notice of
their listing and the grounds therefore; and (5) if such notice is
received, individuals or entities may directly petition the 1267
Committee.55
This regime creates the dilemma discussed briefly in Part I of this
article: when liberty interests are deprived on the basis of a
designation by the 1267 Committee and the targeted individual or
entity decides to challenge that deprivation in the courts of the
Member State implementing such sanctions, the court must choose
one of two options. First, the court may review and possibly
invalidate such sanctions, which could undermine the 1267 sanctions
regime and violate the Member State's obligations under Article 25 of
the Charter. Or, the court may refuse to hear the challenge, thus
possibly denying the petitioner due process rights under local law.
The following two sections compare how the courts of the European
Communities and the United States resolve this dilemma.
Before discussing such a comparison, one must first understand
the differences in the respective legislation adopted to implement the
1267 sanctions regime. As is described in more detail below, the
European Communities and the United States have enacted
fundamentally different implementing legislation.
53. S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617, [ 4, 6 (July 29, 2005).
54. U.N. Charter art. 25; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1617, 1, 4 ("States shall take the
measures previously imposed" pursuant to the 1267 Committee's designations); S.C.
Res. 1526, 1 ("States shall implement the measures with respect to listed
individuals and entities").
55. S.C. Res. 1735, 10-11.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF AND CHALLENGES TO THE 1267
RESOLUTIONS IN EUROPE
A. Implementation of the 1267 Resolutions in Europe
The Commission of the European Communities (Commission)
and the Council of the European Union (Council) have implemented
the 1267 resolutions by adopting regulations that automatically apply
sanctions against any individual or entity designated by the 1267
Committee. After the Security Council adopted Resolution 1333, the
Council responded with Regulation 467/2001, which provides, inter
alia, "[a]ll funds and other financial resources belonging to any
natural or legal person, entity or body designated by the ...[1267
Committee] and listed in Annex I shall be frozen." 56 Annex I to
Regulation 467/2001, in turn, reflects precisely the designations made
by the 1267 Committee.57
Similarly, after the Security Council adopted Resolution 1390, the
Council responded with Regulation 881/2002, which requires the
freezing of assets of any person or entity designated by the 1267
Committee.58
This automatic incorporation of designations by the 1267
Committee into European law has been described by the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities as follows:
[R]egulation [881/2002] was adopted with a view to implementing
in the Community legal order Security Council Resolutions 1267
(1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002) through the automatic
transposition of any list of persons or entities drawn up by the
Sanctions Committee in accordance with the applicable procedures,
without any autonomous discretion whatsoever being exercised, as
is clearly apparent from both the preamble to the contested
regulation and Art. 7(1) thereof.59
56. Council Regulation 467/2001, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 67) 2 (EC).
57. Id. annex 1; Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2005
E.C.R. H-3533.
58. Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 67) 10 (EC) (repealing
Regulation 467/2001).
59. Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. para. 214 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Council and the Commission require states of the
European Community to automatically defer to the discretion of the
1267 Committee in applying targeted sanctions pursuant to the 1267
resolutions.
B. Challenges to the 1267 Resolutions in Europe
In the case of Yusuf v. European Council, the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities was confronted with a local
law challenge to sanctions automatically imposed against European
nationals pursuant to designations by the 1267 Committee.60
Petitioners, Ahmed Alu Yusuf, a Swede of Somali origin, and Al
Barakaat International Foundation, an entity established in Sweden,
argued that Regulation 881/2002 should be annulled on three
independent grounds: (1) the European Community Treaty (Treaty)
did not authorize the Council to promulgate Resolution 881/2002
because that resolution imposes sanctions against nationals of
Member States of the European Union; (2) Resolution 881/2002 is
unlawful because it targets specific individuals and thus is not a
regulation of general application, as required by article 249 of the
Treaty; and (3) the sanctions imposed against petitioners under
Regulation 881/2002 violate "their right to the use of their property
and the right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Art. 6 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ... ."61 It is the court's treatment of this last argument (the
Fundamental Rights Argument) that is the concern of this article.62
In adjudicating the Fundamental Rights Argument, the court
began by questioning whether it had the power to consider that
argument. Thus, the court set forth the threshold test for justiciability:
the court would only rule on "the plea alleging breach of the
applicants' fundamental rights" if (1) such plea "falls within the scope
of its judicial review" and (2) the court would be capable, if such plea
were proved, of annulling the relevant regulation. 63
60. Id. para. 42.
61. Id. para. 190.
62. The court rejected petitioner's first two grounds for annulling Regulation
881/2002 upon the finding that the regulation is authorized by and consistent with
the Treaty provisions relied upon by petitioners. Id. paras. 171, 176, 180, 189.
63. Id. para. 226.
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1. Preliminary Observations
Before applying this threshold test, however, the court offered
"preliminary observations" concerning the relationship between
international and local legal obligations. 64 While the court labeled
such "observations" as "preliminary," in fact, these observations sit at
the heart of the issue and dictated the court's ultimate resolution of the
Fundamental Rights Argument.
The court began its preliminary observations by noting that under
the rule of primacy, embodied in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, States have an obligation under international
law to comply with their treaty obligations, including their obligations
under the Charter. 65 Next, the court noted that under Article 103 of
the Charter, a State's obligation to comply with the Charter also
"prevail[s]" over its obligations under "any other international
agreement." 66 Finally, the court noted that under Article 25 of the
Charter, the primacy of Charter obligations over both domestic law
and other international treaty obligations applies with equal force to
Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Accordingly, the court made the following observations:
Resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations are thus binding on all the
Member States of the Community which must therefore, in that
capacity, take all measures necessary to ensure that those
resolutions are put into effect.
It also follows from the foregoing that, pursuant both to the rules of
general international law and to the specific provisions of the
Treaty, Member States may, and indeed must, leave unapplied any
provision of Community law, whether a provision of primary law or
a general principle of that law, that raises any impediment to the
proper performance of their obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations.
67
64. See id. paras. 226-30.
65. Id. para. 232 ("[A] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
66. Id. para. 234.
67. Id. para. 239-40 (emphasis added).
2008]
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As intimated above, the emphasized portion of this quote is the
driving force behind the court's resolution of the Fundamental Rights
Argument. That argument is predicated on Article 6 of the ECHR (a
"provision of Community law"). The Yusuf court held that Article 6
must remain "unapplied" where, as here, it could constitute an
"impediment to the proper performance of obligations under the
Charter" (i.e. compliance with the 1267 resolutions).68
2. Adjudication of the Merits
Having established that the members of the European Union are
obligated to comply with the 1267 resolutions (irrespective of local
law principles to the contrary) the court turned to the first leg of the
threshold question identified above: does the petitioners' plea alleging
breach of their fundamental rights fall within the scope of the court's
judicial review? The court responded to this question with a qualified
negative.
The court held that insofar as the Council and the Commission
promulgated Regulation 881/2002 pursuant to the 1267 resolutions,
with which, as described above, the members of the European
Community are bound to comply, Regulation 881/2002 was
promulgated "under circumscribed powers, with the result that they
had no autonomous discretion ... they could neither directly alter the
content of the resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism capable
of giving rise to such alteration. '"69 Thus, the court held that the
Fundamental Rights Argument was, in substance, an indirect
challenge to the lawfulness of the 1267 resolutions themselves.7 0 The
68. Id. para. 240.
69. Id. para. 265.
70. Id. para. 266; see also para. 267:
[I]f the court were to annul the contested regulation, as the applicants
claim it should, although that regulation seems to be imposed by
international law, on the ground that that act infringes their fundamental
rights which are protected by the Community legal order, such annulment
would indirectly mean that the resolutions of the Security Council
concerned themselves infringe those fundamental rights. In other words,
the applicants ask the court to declare by implication that the provision of
international law at issue infringes the fundamental rights of individuals,
as protected by the Community legal order.
Id. para. 267.
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court ruled, however, that it did not have the authority to "undertake
such indirect review of the lawfulness of [the 1267] resolutions"
because under international law, those resolutions are "binding on
Member States of the Community [and thus are] mandatory for the
court as they are for all the Community institutions.'
The court, however, qualified its rejection of the Fundamental
Rights Argument with the recognition that, although the court did not
have the power to review the 1267 resolutions (and in turn Regulation
881/2002) under the laws of the European Community, the court did
have the power to review such directives under jus cogens, which the
court described as "a body of higher rules of public international law
binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the
United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible."72 In other
words, the court held that, to the extent that Security Council
resolutions violate jus cogens, the resolutions are themselves
unauthorized; and in such circumstances, the Court of First Instance
has the jurisdictional authority to declare Security Council resolutions
invalid (including resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter). Pursuant to this holding, the court proceeded to analyze the
1267 resolutions under jus cogens. The court held that the
requirements of jus cogens were satisfied because under the 1267
resolutions and Regulation 881/2002, sanctioned individuals and
entities could petition their national authorities to request that the
1267 Committee remove their name from the list of designated
targets.73
71. Id. at paras. 268-69; see also para. 276:
It must therefore be considered that the resolutions of the Security Council
at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court's judicial review
and that the Court has no authority to call in question, even indirectly,
their lawfulness in the light of Community law. On the contrary, the Court
is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in a manner
compatible with the obligations of the Member States under the Charter of
the United Nations.
Id. para. 276.
72. Id. para. 277.
73. Id. paras. 307, 309, 312. It is worth noting that Resolution 1730 (2006),
adopted after the Yusuf decision, provides designated individuals and entities with
the ability to petition their de-listing directly with the 1267 Committee. S.C. Res.
1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
2008]
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C. Looking Back at the Holding in Yusuf
To understand the precise holding of the court in Yusuf, it is useful
to briefly compare that decision to a subsequent decision of the Court
of First Instance in Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d'Iran
v. Council of the European Union (OMPI).74 In OMPI, the petitioner
challenged certain regulations and decisions of the Commission and of
the Council, which froze the petitioner's assets. The challenged
regulations and decisions were adopted pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.75
Resolution 1373 "[d]ecide[d] that all States shall ... freeze without
delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources" of
persons or entities that have committed, attempted to commit,
participated in or facilitated terrorist acts.76 The petitioner claimed
that the freezing of his assets violated, inter alia, the ECHR.77
Thus, the petition in the OMPI case was similar to the petition in
the Yusuf case. In both cases, the courts confronted challenges to
regulations and decisions of the Commission and of the Council,
which froze the petitioners' assets; the petitioners alleged, inter alia,
violations of their rights under the ECHR; and the challenged
regulations and decisions were adopted pursuant to decisions of the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Nevertheless, the
holding in OMPI was quite different than that in Yusuf. The court in
OMPI held that it did have the authority to review the freezing of the
petitioners' assets under, inter alia, the ECHR.78 Indeed, the OMPI
court ultimately granted the petition on the ground that the procedural
guarantees of the ECHR were violated.79
The point of departure of the Yusuf and OMPI decisions lies in the
details of the relevant Security Council resolutions. As the court in
OMPI explained, the 1267 resolutions required "the freezing of the
74. Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council
of the Eur. Union, 2006 E.C.R. 00 (2006).
75. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
76. Id. 1 (c).
77. See Organisation des Modjahedines, 2006 E.C.J. para. 61.
78. See id. paras. 108, 113, 137.
79. Id. paras. 160-74 (annulling the challenged decisions to freeze petitioner's
assets on the ground that the procedure pursuant to which the decision was adopted
did not adequately observe the petitioner's right to a fair hearing under the ECHR).
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funds of the parties concerned, designated by name, without in any
way authorising [European] institutions, at the time of actual
implementation, to provide for any Community mechanism
whatsoever for the examination or re-examination of individual
situations." 80 Thus, the mandates of 1267 resolutions and the 1267
Committee were "transposed into the Community legal order, as they
were required to [be].'
Resolution 1373, by contrast, "d[id] not specify individually the
persons, groups and entities who are to be the subjects of those
measures." 82 Rather, the OMPI court noted, under Resolution 1373:
[I]t is for the Member States of the United Nations (UN)-
and, in this case, the Community, through which its Member
States have decided to act-to identify specifically the
persons, groups and entities whose funds are to be frozen
pursuant to that resolution, in accordance with the rules in
their own legal order.83
Thus, measures adopted to implement Resolution 1373 "do not
come within the exercise of circumscribed powers and accordingly do
not benefit from the primacy effect" provided for in Articles 25 and
103 of the U.N. Charter. 84 "Since the identification of the persons,
groups and entities contemplated in [Resolution 1373], and the
adoption of the ensuing measure of freezing funds, involve the
exercise of the Community's own powers, entailing a discretionary
appreciation by the Community," the OMPI court concluded, "the
Community institutions concerned ... are in principle bound to
observe the right to a fair hearing"; 85 the rights guaranteed by the
ECHR.
In summary, the decisions in Yusuf and OMPI establish that, in
Europe, the obligations of Member States of the United Nations to
comply with targeted sanctions specifically mandated by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter are enforced even if such
80. Id. para. 100.
81. Id.
82. Id. para. 101.
83. Id. para. 102.
84. Id. para. 103.
85. Id. para. 107.
2008]
21
Meyers: The Transatlantic Divide Over the Implementation and Enforcement
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
276 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
compliance is inconsistent with due process rights provided for under
local law (the ECHR). This prioritization of the particular mandates
of international law over local law is reflected by the legislation
adopted in Europe to implement the 1267 resolutions and by the
aforementioned decisions of the European Court of First Instance.
The following Section will demonstrate that in the United States, by
contrast, governmental institutions prioritize local due process rights
over obligations imposed by international law, and in particular, the
Charter.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF AND CHALLENGES TO
THE 1267 RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Implementation of the 1267 Resolutions in the United States
Unlike Regulation 881/2002, the legislation enacted by the United
States to implement the 1267 resolutions does not automatically adopt
designations made by the 1267 Commission. Rather, the
implementing legislation in the United States establishes a system
whereby the Executive Branch, acting through the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC), an office in the Department of Treasury, is
empowered (but not required) to promulgate rules and regulations
sanctioning individuals and entities designated by the 1267
Committee. Thus, unlike the case in Europe, the United States
exercises "autonomous discretion . . . [to] alter the content of the
resolutions at issue.",86 The particular statutes, orders, and regulations
establishing this discretionary regime are set forth below.
Initially, under section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 (the UNPA),
whenever the United States is called upon by the Security Council
to apply measures which said Council has decided, pursuant to
article 41 of said Charter, are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions under said Charter, the President may, to the extent
necessary to apply such measures, through any agency which
86. Cf. Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2005 E.C.R. II-
3533 para. 265 (finding that under the relevant European implementing legislation,
the Council and the Commission "had no autonomous discretion .... [T]hey could
neither directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism
capable of giving rise to such alteration.").
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he may designate, and under such rules, and regulations as may be
prescribed by him, investigate, prohibit or regulate, in whole or in
part, economic relations ...between any foreign country or any
national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any
person subject to the jurisdiction thereof. 87
Acting pursuant to this authority, on September 23, 2001,
President Bush issued Executive Order 13,224 (E.O. 13,224) to
"establish[] a mechanism to monitor the implementation of UNSCR
1333. "88 E.O. 13,224 was explicitly issued "in view of' Security
Council Resolutions 1214, 1267, 1333, and 1363.89
Under section 7 of E.O. 13,224 the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to "take such actions, including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by
IEEPA and UNPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this order[,]" including the authority to "redelegate any of these
functions to other officers and agencies of the United States
Government." 90
Acting pursuant to this authority to redelegate, the Secretary of
the Treasury empowered OFAC to promulgate regulations to carry out
the purposes of E.O. 13,224.91 OFAC, in turn, enacted the Global
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. section 594. Under
section 594.201(a), "property and interests in property" are blocked if
owned by persons (a) who are foreign nationals listed in the Annex to
E.O. 13224; (b) who are foreign nationals determined by the Secretary
87. 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a).
88. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). UNSCR
refers to the United Nations Security Council Resolution. Id.
89. Id.; see Letter dated 17 April 2003 from the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee U.N. Doc. S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/26, (April 2003) at 3 ("Executive Order
(E.O.) 13,224 provides the legal authority to ensure that the funds and financial or
other economic resources of those individuals and entities listed pursuant to UNSCR
1267, 1333, 1390 and 1455 within the United States or within the possession or
control of U.S. persons are frozen without delay .... The USG administers sanctions
imposed pursuant to E.O. 13,224 through [OFAC].").
90. Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 88.
91. 31 C.F.R. § 594.802 (2007) ("Any action that the Secretary of the Treasury
is authorized to take pursuant to Executive Order 13224 ... and any further
Executive orders relating to the national emergency declared therein, may be taken
by the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control ...").
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of State to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of
committing, acts of terrorism; (c) determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury "to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of,
any person whose property or interests in property are blocked" under
these regulations; or (d) determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
to provide certain support to terrorists or other persons blocked
pursuant to these regulations.
92
Thus, in the United States, the authority to determine which
individuals and entities will be sanctioned as a result of the 1267
resolutions ultimately rests with the Executive Branch of the United
States Government, not with the 1267 Committee.93  While the
Executive Branch is, of course, free to consider the designations of the
1267 Committee in determining who to sanction (unlike in Europe),
the implementing legislation in the United States does not oblige the
Executive Branch to adopt such designations. 94 As a result, when
courts in the United States are faced with challenges to sanctions
imposed pursuant to E.O. 13,224, they regard such challenges as
appeals of autonomous actions of the United States government.
Accordingly, courts in the United States readily scrutinize such
challenges under local due process standards.
B. Challenges to 1267 Sanctions in the United States
At least five actions have been commenced in United States
federal courts by individuals and/or entities challenging OFAC
sanctions issued pursuant to E.O. 13.224 (i.e. sanctions that relate
back to the 1267 resolutions). 95 Of these, at least three cases have
92. 31 C.F.R. § 594.201(a) (2007).
93. 31 C.F.R. § 594.201(a).
94. It is worth noting that the practical effect of this difference is unclear. This
author has been unable to discover a single case of an individual or entity listed by
the 1267 Committee, but not listed by the OFAC regulations.
95. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp.
2d 34 (D.D.C. 2005); Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, No. 02-CV-
789 (JMR/FLN), 02-CV-790 (MJD-JGL), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16190 (D. Minn.
Aug. 21, 2003); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill.
2002), affd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002); Holy Land Found. For Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002), afJ'd 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see
also Letter dated 2 September 2005 from the Chairman of the Security Council
24
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alleged that the imposition of such sanctions constitutes a deprivation
of the petitioners' liberty interests in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In
each case, the federal courts (including two appellate-level courts)
exercised jurisdiction over the challenges and disposed of them on the
merits.
In Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill,9 6 Global Relief
Foundation (Global Relief), a non-profit corporation chartered in
Illinois, challenged a blocking order issued by OFAC pursuant to E.O.
13,224, which froze all funds, accounts and business records in which
Global Relief had an interest.97 Global Relief argued, inter alia, that
the blocking notice "violat[ed] its right to due process by temporarily
blocking Global Relief from its property and business without any
judicial oversight." 98 Specifically, Global Relief argued that it was
deprived of its due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be
heard pre-deprivation, and to sufficient post-deprivation notice and
opportunity to be heard.99
As regards pre-deprivation due process rights, the court explained:
The due process clause generally requires the government to afford
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before depriving a
person of certain property interests. However, when exigent
circumstances are present and the government demonstrates a
pressing need for prompt action, the Supreme Court has long struck
the procedural due process balance so as to dispense with the
requirement for a pre-deprivation hearing. 
100
The court then held that in the circumstances of the case before it,
where "the exigencies of national security and foreign policy
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) U.N. Doc. S/2005/572
(Sept. 9 2005) at 50-51; Letter dated 17 April 2003 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to
the Chairman of the Committee U.N. Doc. S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/26 (Apr. 22, 2003)
at 4.
96. Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill.
2002), affd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 786.
98. Id. at 803.
99. Id. at 788.
100. Id. at 803 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
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considerations" are at issue and where "[p]re-deprivation notice
would, in fact, be antithetical to the objectives of these sanctions
programs," the petitioner was unlikely to succeed in proving its claim
that pre-deprivation notice and hearing were required by the Due
Process Clause. 0
1
As regards post-deprivation procedures, the court held that OFAC
provides "a variety of post-blocking options which satisfied its due
process obligations."' 102  Specifically, the court recognized that the
OFAC blocking notice informed Global Relief that it had the right to:
[P]resent evidence and/or argument to OFAC if it believed the
blocking was made in error, including the right to make
submissions by facsimile "to expedite" OFAC's response. The
notice also informed Global Relief of OFAC's "licensing authority
to help ameliorate the effects of the blocking" of Global Relief's
funds and accounts. Through the licensing authority, Global Relief
could obtain funds to pay salaries, rent, utility payments, and
attorneys fees. The notice also referred Global Relief to relevant
agency regulations and provided it with an agency contact and
phone number in case any questions arose. 103
Thus, the court held that the petitioner was unlikely to succeed in
proving its claim that the post-deprivation procedures violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Global Relief appealed this
decision and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
adopting precisely the analysis of the lower court. 104
Similarly, in Holy Land Foundation For Relief & Development v.
Ashcroft, 0 5 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
("HLF'), a non-profit corporation, asserted a Fifth Amendment
challenge to a blocking order issued by OFAC pursuant to E.O.
101. Id. at 803-04.
102. Id. at 804.
103. Id. at 804-05 (noting that despite the availability of these mechanisms,
Global Relief did not take advantage of them). It should be noted that these rights
were not provided to Global Relief on an ad hoc basis, but rather are guaranteed by
the OFAC regulations to all sanctioned individuals and entities. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 594.801.
104. Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).
105. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57
(D.D.C. 2002), affd 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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13,224, which froze all of HLF's assets.10 6 The court rejected this
argument on the merits, undertaking a similar analysis to the decisions
in Global Relief Foundation and holding that plaintiffs had failed to
establish a violation of their due process rights.10 7  Upon HLF's
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.' 0
Finally, in Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI
Agents, 109 a United States federal court again rejected a due process
challenge to sanctions imposed by OFAC pursuant to E.O. 13,224 on
the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to establish that the facts of the
case constituted a violation of their due process rights.1 0
The significance of these decisions for the purposes of this article
is that the American courts did not begin with "preliminary
observations" concerning the relationship of international law and
domestic law because the targeted sanctions were implemented
pursuant to federal regulations that do not themselves explicitly rely
on the 1267 resolutions, unlike the Yusuf decision. Rather, the
American courts treated the relevant sanctions as any other Executive
Branch action and proceeded to review the merits of the petitioners'
due process challenges. Indeed, these decisions did not even
recognize that the statutory authority for the OFAC regulations is
ultimately traceable to the 1267 resolutions."'
Although these decisions found the sanctions to be consistent with
due process, they confirm that courts in the United States will strike
106. Id. at 62.
107. Id. at 76-77.
108. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
109. Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F.
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2005).
110. Id. at 48-50.
111. One may respond that these courts did not address the rule of primacy and
Article 25 of the Charter because no party raised that argument. To the extent that
this is true, it is, in and of itself, revealing. The United States Government was the
defendant in each of these cases. To the extent that Article 25 of the Charter is
relevant, it constitutes a defense to the petitioners' challenges. Surely, the
government lawyers were aware of the existence of Article 25. The fact that the
government did not rely on that defense demonstrates the very point of this article:
the United States does not believe that international law obligations are controlling
in such circumstances (especially when such obligations may conflict with due
process rights under domestic U.S. law).
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down such sanctions in the appropriate factual circumstances. That
the sanctions relate back to Chapter VII resolutions of the Security
Council does not alter this analysis. Put otherwise, these decisions
confirm that the United States prioritizes local due process concerns
over its obligations under international law. In light of the breadth
and open-endedness of the "war" on terror, it may only be a matter of
time before a United States court invalidates the application of
sanctions called for by the 1267 resolutions, rendering the Untied
States in violation of its obligations -under Article 25 of the Charter.
V. CAN THE 1267 SANCTIONS REGIME BE AMENDED
TO AvOID THIS DILEMMA?
Much has been written on the need to improve targeted sanctions
regimes-including the 1267 regime specifically-in order to better
protect due process rights. Indeed, the Security Council has already
adopted several such improvements, perhaps as a result of such
writings. 112 The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations even
commissioned a study into just this subject. This study, the
Fassbender Report, recommends that targeted sanctions regimes be
amended to include the following four procedural safeguards:
(a) the right of a person or entity against whom measures have been
taken to be informed about those measures by the Council, as soon
as this is possible without thwarting their purpose;
(b) the right of such a person or entity to be heard by the Council,
or a subsidiary body, within a reasonable time;
(c) the right of such a person or entity of being advised and
represented in his or her dealings with the Council;
(d) the right of such a person or entity to an effective remedy
against an individual measure before an impartial institution or
body previously established. 
113
While safeguards (a) and (b) have been, to varying degrees,
incorporated into the 1267 sanctions regime, safeguards (c) and (d)
have not been explicitly provided for by the Security Council.
Similarly, the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown
University has published a report, the Watson Institute Report,
112. See supra Part II.C.
113. Fassenbender Report, supra note 16, at 28.
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containing several further recommendations for improved procedural
protections not currently provided for in the 1267 resolutions. The
Watson Institute Report recommends, inter alia, (a) establishing a
biennial review of listings; (b) establishing a mechanism to guarantee
the right of effective remedy and redress; and (c) developing a review
mechanism under the authority of the Security Council for
consideration of delisting requests. 114
While the adoption of such recommendations would undoubtedly
improve the due process protections within the 1267 sanctions regime,
such improvements would only have a limited effect on the
fundamental dilemma discussed in this article. Specifically, while
improved procedural protections would make it less likely that any
local court would ever find that the 1267 procedures violate local due
process law, such amendments would not change the fact that courts
in the United States (and likely elsewhere) would still scrutinize the
imposition of sanctions traceable to Chapter VII decisions. Thus,
such improvements would not close the door to the possibility of local
courts rendering a Member State in violation of its Article 25
obligations. Nevertheless, they would greatly reduce the likelihood of
such a scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
Comparing how the courts of the European Communities and the
United States resolve local law challenges to sanctions mandated by
the 1267 resolutions provides a clear example of Kagan's description
of the conflicting views of the international legal order held by Europe
and America. While this article is not intended to definitively resolve
why Europe and America have such conflicting views, by way of
conclusion, it is nevertheless worthwhile to suggest that perhaps the
underlying difference is the product of the adoption of monist-versus-
dualist systems of law.
The monist-dualist distinction has been aptly described by
Professor Curtis A. Bradley as follows:
The monist view is that international and domestic law are part of
the same legal order, international law is automatically incorporated
into each nation's legal system, and international law is supreme
114. WATSON INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 13, at 42-45.
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over domestic law. Monism thus requires, among other things, that
domestic courts "give effect to international law, notwithstanding
inconsistent domestic law, even domestic law of constitutional
character." By contrast, the dualist view is that international and
domestic law are distinct, each nation determines for itself when
and to what extent international law is incorporated into its legal
system, and the status of international law in the domestic system is
determined by domestic law. 115
The American legal system has adopted a dualist approach to
international law." 6 Thus, decisions of the Security Council under the
Charter are incorporated into the American legal system only to the
extent American law so provides. Here, the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution does not permit the incorporation of the 1267 resolutions
into American law in a manner that violates due process rights. Thus,
American courts readily scrutinize the application of targeted
sanctions traceable to the 1267 resolutions under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.
In the European legal system, on the other hand, a monist
approach to international law has been adopted." 7 Thus, the Yusuf
court held that international law (embodied in Articles 25 and 103 of
the Charter, and in the 1267 resolutions), is automatically incorporated
into the European legal order, notwithstanding inconsistent provisions
in the ECHR.
115. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 530 (1999) (quoting Louis
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64-67 (1995)).
116. Fred L. Morrison, Characteristics of International Administration in
Crisis Areas: A View from the United States of America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 443,
448 (2006) ("The government and courts in the United States, like those in most
common law systems, start from a dualist approach to issues of international law.").
117. See Mattias Kumm, Beyond Golf Clubs and the Judicialization of
Politics: Why Europe has a Constitution Properly So Called, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
505, 513-14 (2006) ("[T]he ECJ, since the 1960s has consistently held that in case
of a conflict between European and national law Member States courts are under an
obligation to set aside all national law, even national constitutional law."). The
Yusuf decision strongly indicates that European law is not only monist in its
relationship to the national law of its Member States, but also in its relationship to
international law more generally. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the Eur.
Union, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3533.
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Regardless of whether the monist-dualist distinction adequately
explains why European and American institutions implement and
enforce the 1267 resolutions in fundamentally different ways, this
case study is particularly interesting because here, the United States'
failure to satisfy its obligations under Article 25 of the Charter results
in a greater protection of the "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" enshrined in the Charter, even in the context of the "war"
on terror.
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